Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence
AbstractIs unemployment the overwhelming determinant of domestic violence that many commentators expect it to be? The contribution of this paper is to examine, theoretically and empirically, how changes in unemployment affect the incidence of domestic abuse. The key theoretical prediction is that male and female unemployment have opposite-signed effects on domestic abuse: anincrease in male unemployment decreases the incidence of intimate partner violence, while an increase in female unemployment increases domestic abuse. Combining data on intimate partnerviolence from the British Crime Survey with locally disaggregated labor market data from the UK’s Annual Population Survey, we find strong evidence in support of the theoretical prediction.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4315.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
domestic violence; unemployment;
Other versions of this item:
- Anderberg, Dan & Rainer, Helmut & Wadsworth, Jonathan & Wilson, Tanya, 2013. "Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 7515, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Dan Anderberg & Helmut Rainer & Jonathan Wadsworth & Tanya Wilson, 2013. "Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence," CEP Discussion Papers dp1230, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
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