Income Splitting – is it Good for Both Partners in the Marriage?
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of an income splitting system on marriage partners. The focus is on the time allocation, on investment in marriage-specific human capital and on the distribution of income within the family. Two insights are discussed in detail. First, the distribution of tax-reduction gains due to the income splitting system depends on whether the family has been started or not. After marriage, joint taxation increases redistribution among family members. Second, although the income splitting system reduces the tax burden of the family, it might harm the marriage partner that is more productive in household production provided that potential marriage partners foresee the effects of joint taxation on the family.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 391.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Income taxation; income splitting; private provision of public goods; household production;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1995. " Family Policy with Non-cooperative Families," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 581-601, December.
- Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1996.
"The Bargaining Family Revisited,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1312, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konrad, K.A. & Lommerud, K.E., 2000. "The Bargaining Family Revisited," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 212, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Pechman, Joseph A. & Engelhardt, Gary V., 1990. "The Income Tax Treatment of the Family: An International Perspective," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-22, March.
- Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
- Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993.
"Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
- Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Harvey S. Rosen, 1987. "The Marriage Tax is Down But Not Out," NBER Working Papers 2231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael J. Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski, 1979.
"Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family: Married Couples,"
NBER Working Papers
0368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boskin, Michael J. & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1983. "Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 281-297, April.
- Ihori, Toshihiro, 1996. "International public goods and contribution productivity differentials," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 139-154, July.
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
- Alm, James & Whittington, Leslie A., 1997. "Income taxes and the timing of marital decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 219-240, May.
- Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the Household," Munich Reprints in Economics 3411, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May.
- Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, 1997. "'Til Death or Taxes Do Us Part: The Effect of Income Taxation on Divorce," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(2), pages 388-412.
- Apps, Patricia F. & Rees, Ray, 1988. "Taxation and the household," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 355-369, April.
- Kemnitz, Alexander & Thum, Marcel, 2013.
"Gender power, fertility, and family policy,"
Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics
01/13, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Alexander Kemnitz & Marcel Thum, 2012. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3798, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kemnitz, Alexander & Thum, Marcel, 2013. "Gender Power, Fertility, and Family Policy," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79827, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.