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Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap

Author

Listed:
  • Linda Cohen

    (University of California, Irvine)

  • Amihai Glazer

    (University of California, Irvine)

Abstract

Consider spouses who engage in Nash bargaining to allocate resources between them. The person with a higher income when unmarried enjoys a larger share of the joint income, and benefits less from an increase in joint income. This difference can cause spouses who have the same utility functions and the same family incomes to differ in their benefits from governmental tax and spending policies, and to cast opposing votes. In particular, these incentives can generate a gender gap, with women more supportive than men of governmental taxes and spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Linda Cohen & Amihai Glazer, 2017. "Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 1399-1413, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:15:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11150-015-9317-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-015-9317-6
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage; Bargaining; Taxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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