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French CEO Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit?

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  • Fabienne Llense

Abstract

In the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to what extend such a model could explain the observed CEO compensations. The size elasticity of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To moderate those compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European left but also, more surprisingly, by representative of shareholders. The cost of this policy is evaluated in this sorting model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2402.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2402

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  1. Robert M. Costrell & Glenn C. Loury, 2004. "Distribution of Ability and Earnings in a Hierarchical Job Assignment Model," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-135, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2010. "Risk and CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?," Working Papers 10-17, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
  2. Frédéric TEULON, 2014. "CEO compensation and topmanagement incentives. Internal or social problems ?," Working Papers 2014-187, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  3. Marika Karanassou & Hector Sala, 2010. "The Wage-Productivity Gap Revisited: Is the Labour Share Neutral to Employment?," Working Papers wpdea1006, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
  4. Karanassou, Marika & Sala, Hector, 2011. "Inequality and Employment Sensitivities to the Falling Labour Share," IZA Discussion Papers 5796, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2010. "Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?," NBER Working Papers 15987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Schmutzler, Armin & Gersbach, Hans, 2013. "Does globalization create superstars? A simple theory of managerial wages," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79804, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  7. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi, 2011. "Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, February.
  8. John Thanassoulis, 2012. "Bank Pay Caps, Bank Risk, and Macroprudential Regulation," Economics Series Working Papers 636, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Carola Frydman, 2008. "Learning from the Past: Trends in Executive Compensation over the Twentieth Century," CESifo Working Paper Series 2460, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. John Thanassoulis, 2011. "The Case For Intervening In Bankers' Pay," Economics Series Working Papers 532, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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