Wages and Seniority When Coworkers Matter: Estimating a Joint Production Economy Using Norwegian Administrative Data
AbstractWe develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from Norway. Coworkers interact through a task-assignment model, and wages are determined through multilateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority affects wages through workplace output and relative bargaining power. These channels are separately identified by imposing equilibrium restrictions on data observing all workers within workplaces. We find joint production is important. Seniority affects bargaining power but is unproductive. We reinterpret gender and firm-size effects in wages in light of the rejection of linearly separable production.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4130.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Christopher Ferrall & Kjell G. Salvanes & Erik Ø. Sørensen, 2009. "Wages And Seniority When Coworkers Matter: Estimating A Joint Production Economy Using Norwegian Administrative Data," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1200, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
- J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-05-16 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2009-05-16 (Labour Economics)
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- Elena Pastorino, 2013. "Job matching within and across firms," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 482, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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