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CEO compensation and topmanagement incentives. Internal or social problems ?

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Author Info

  • Frédéric TEULON

Abstract

This paper analyzes the income of french top managers taking as a sample firms that made the CAC 40 in 2009. The pay gap between CEOs and unskilled workers have never been higher. In our view, explanations of this trend are not solely related to economic causes (transformation of the labor market, failure of control systems…), they also result from transformation of the ruling classes and from the modification of their place in the society (loss of morality, inbreeding, collusion public/private). We must return to principles of common sense (an incentive payment but not abusive) in a societal perspective. Different solutions are presented and discussed

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Research, Ipag Business School in its series Working Papers with number 2014-187.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 25 Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-187

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Related research

Keywords: Agency problem; CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Top-management incentives; Rent seeking;

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References

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  1. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," NBER Working Papers 6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Fabienne Llense, 2010. "French CEOs' Compensations: What is the Cost of a Mandatory Upper Limit?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, CESifo, vol. 56(2), pages 165-191, June.
  3. Cahuc, Pierre & Challe, Edouard, 2009. "Produce or Speculate? Asset Bubbles, Occupational Choice and Efficiency," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7602, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2006. "The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 200-205, May.
  5. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  6. Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "The Economics of Superstars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 845-58, December.
  7. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  8. Hallock, Kevin F., 1997. "Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(03), pages 331-344, September.
  9. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-30, May.
  10. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, 1981. "Are Those Paid More Really More Productive? The Case of Experience," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 16(2), pages 186-216.
  11. George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, 2004. "CEO Incentives and Firm Size," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(4), pages 767-798, October.
  12. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
  13. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are Ceos Rewarded For Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932, August.
  14. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  15. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "Ce que Bourdieu veut (nous) dire," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-497, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  2. Rey Dang & Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "Les déterminants organisationnels de la représentation des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration des entreprises du SBF 120," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-397, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  3. Zied Ftiti & Essahbi Essaadi, 2014. "The inflation Targeting effect on the inflation series: A New Analysis Approach of evolutionary spectral analysis," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-516, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  4. Dorra Talbi, 2014. "CEO Age and Real Earnings Management," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-429, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  5. Frederic Teulon, 2014. "Raymond Boudon, le principe de rationalité et l’individualisme méthodologique," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-524, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  6. Dorra Talbi, 2014. "Voluntary disclosure frequency and cost of debt capital: Evidence from the Tunisian context," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-433, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  7. Frederic Teulon, 2014. "La théorie de la justice selon John Rawls," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-525, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

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