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Innovation Strategies in a Competitive Dynamic Setting

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  • Ruslan Lukach
  • Joseph Plasmans
  • Peter M. Kort

Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic model of a competitive R&D and production duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers. Two asymmetric firms operate for a limited period of time and dispose their knowledge capital in the end. Both firms and the social planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over the competitive one regardless of the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Accumulation of knowledge capital results allows the monopolist to have lower marginal cost of production and charge a lower market price than a fully competitive duopoly. Being able to define the degree of knowledge exchange when creating a research joint venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2005/wp-cesifo-2005-02/cesifo1_wp1395.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1395.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1395

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Keywords: innovation; R&D; spillovers; cooperation;

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  1. Andrew Brod & Ram Shivakumar, 1997. "R&D Cooperation and the Joint Exploitation of R&D," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 673-84, August.
  2. Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G., 1997. "Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures," Papers 97-06, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  3. Reinganum, Jennifer F., . "Dynamic Games of Innovation," Working Papers 287, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. AMIR, Rabah & EVSTIGNEEV, Igor & WOODERS, John, 2001. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," CORE Discussion Papers 2001050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Kline, J.J., 1998. "Research Joint Ventures and the Cost Paradox," Papers 356, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
  6. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1307-20, December.
  7. Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2000. "Strategic R&D Co-operatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 153-185, June.
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