R&D and production behavior of asymmetric duopoly subject to knowledge spillover
AbstractWe construct an asymmetric duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of different size. The paper concludes that the introduction of asymmetry into the A&J (1988) model leads to different R&D expenditures and production decisions made by the firms. Simulations show that the bigger agent has larger R&D expenditures and higher output. If firms choose the monopoly collusion or the welfaremaximizing strategy, the optimal solution implies that R&D is conducted asymmetrically by both agents, but that production is conducted only by the largest agent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000005.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2000
Date of revision:
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Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
More information through EDIRC
Innovation; R&D; Spillovers; Cooperation;
Other versions of this item:
- Joseph Plasmans, 2000. "R&D and Production Behavior of Asymmetric Duopoly Subject to Knowledge Spillovers," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 287, CESifo Group Munich.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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