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Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic

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  • Jens Josephson
  • Karl Wärneryd

Abstract

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2004/wp-cesifo-2004-10/cesifo1_wp1319.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1319.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1319

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Keywords: work ethic; evolution; group selection; public goods; stochastic dynamics;

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  1. Arthur J. Robson, 2002. "Evolution and Human Nature," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 89-106, Spring.
  2. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2006. "When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action," Economics Series Working Papers 269, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
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  6. George J. Mailath, . ""Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 98-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  7. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, 05.
  8. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  9. Sjostrom, Tomas & Weitzman, Martin L., 1996. "Competition and the evolution of efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 25-43, July.
  10. Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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  14. Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks, 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 239-259, March.
  15. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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  17. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1988. "Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 309-332, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis, 2012. "An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 497-515, June.

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