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Corporate governance, competition, the new international financial architecture and large corporations in emerging markets

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  • Ajit Singh
  • Bruce Weisse
  • Alaka Singh

Abstract

This paper examines from the developing countries perspective important analytical and policy issues arising from: a) the current international discussions about corporate governance in relation to the New International Financial Architecture; b) changes in the international competitive environment being caused by the enormous international merger movement in advanced countries. The paper's main conclusions include: the thesis that the deeper causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of corporate governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected countries is not supported by the evidence; emerging markets, as well as European countries, have successful records of fast long-term growth with different governance systems, indeed superior to those of Anglo-Saxon countries; corporate financing patterns in emerging markets in the 1990s continue to be anomalous, as they were in the 1980s; and the claim that developing country conglomerates are inefficient and financially precarious is not supported by evidence or analysis.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ESRC Centre for Business Research in its series ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers with number wp250.

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Date of creation: Dec 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp250

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Keywords: Corporate governance; competition; emerging markets.;

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References

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  1. Whittington, G & Saporta, V & Singh, A, 1997. "The Effects of Hyper-Inflation on Accounting Ratios. Financing Corporate Growth in Industrial Economies," Papers 3, World Bank - International Finance Corporation.
  2. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Singh, Ajit, 1997. "Financial Liberalisation, Stockmarkets and Economic Development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 771-82, May.
  4. James Tybout, 1999. "Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?," Development and Comp Systems 9906001, EconWPA, revised 10 Jun 1999.
  5. Singh, Ajit & Zammit, Josephine Ann, 1999. "International Capital Flows: Identifying the Gender Dimension," MPRA Paper 53535, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
  7. Ajit Singh, 1998. "Savings, investment and the corporation in the East Asian miracle," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(6), pages 112-137.
  8. Erik BERGLÖF & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : Implications for Transition and Developing Countries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9912, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  9. Singh, A., 1997. "Liberalisation, the Stock Market and the Market for Corporate Control: A Bridge Too Far for the Indian Economy?," Accounting and Finance Discussion Papers 97-af35, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  10. Singh, Ajit, 1998. "Financial crisis in East Asia: "The end of the Asian model"?," MPRA Paper 53539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Glen, J. & Lee, K. & Singh. A., 2000. "Competition, Corporate Governance and Financing of corporate Growth in Emerging Markets," Accounting and Finance Discussion Papers 00-af46, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  12. Connolly, Robert A. & Schwartz, Steven, 1985. "The intertemporal behavior of economic profits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 379-400, December.
  13. Singh, Ajit & Singh, Alaka & Wiess, Bruce, 2000. "Information Technology, Venture Capital and the Stock Market," Accounting and Finance Discussion Papers 00-af47, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  14. Singh, Ajit & Weisse, Bruce, 1998. "The Asian model: a crisis foretold," MPRA Paper 54002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Singh, A. & Hamid, J., 1992. "Corporate Financial Structure in Developing Countries," Papers 1, World Bank - International Finance Corporation.
  16. Goddard, J. A. & Wilson, J. O. S., 1999. "The persistence of profit: a new empirical interpretation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 663-687, July.
  17. Simon Johnson & Peter Boone & Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 297, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  18. Singh, Ajit, 1994. "Corporate financial patterns in industrialising economies: a comparative international study," MPRA Paper 54936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
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  21. Leff, Nathaniel H, 1979. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Problem Revisited," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 46-64, March.
  22. Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence and unanswered questions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 748-761, May.
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  26. Waring, Geoffrey F, 1996. "Industry Differences in the Persistence of Firm-Specific Returns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1253-65, December.
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  28. Armen A. Aichian & Reuben A. Kessel, 1962. "Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain," NBER Chapters, in: Aspects of Labor Economics, pages 157-184 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  30. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
  31. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
  32. Leff, Nathaniel H, 1978. "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: The Economic Groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(4), pages 661-75, July.
  33. Amjad,Rashid, 2008. "Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521053617, April.
  34. Vives,Xavier (ed.), 2000. "Corporate Governance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521781640, April.
  35. Geroski, Paul A & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "The Persistence of Profits: A European Comparison," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 375-89, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Deakin, Simon & Singh, Ajit, 2008. "The stock market, the market for corporate control and the theory of the firm: legal and economic perspectives and implications for public policy," MPRA Paper 53792, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. John Armour & Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar & Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, 2008. "Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis," WEF Working Papers 0041, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
  3. Michael Graff, 2006. "Myths and Truths: The «Law and Finance Theory» Revisited," KOF Working papers 06-122, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  4. Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, 2006. "Corporate Governance, Crony capitalism and Economic Crisis: Should the US Business Model replace the Asian Way of 'Doing Business'?," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp329, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  5. Ajit Singh, 2002. "Competition, corporate governance and selection in emerging markets," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp247, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  6. Michael Graff, 2005. "Law and Finance: Common-law and Civil-law Countries Compared," KOF Working papers 05-99, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  7. Christoph Walkner, 2004. "Issues in corporate governance," European Economy - Economic Papers 200, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  8. Michael Graff, 2013. "Legal origin and financial development: new evidence for old claims? The creditor rights index revisited," International Journal of Trade and Global Markets, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(4), pages 326-344.
  9. Singh, Ajit, 2003. "Corporate governance, the big business groups and the G-7 reform agenda: A critical analysis," MPRA Paper 24663, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Reaz, Mazrur & Arun, Thankom G., 2005. "Corporate Governance in Developing Economies: Perspective from the Banking Sector in Bangladesh," Development Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 30545, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
  11. Singh, Ajit, 2003. "Corporate governance, corporate finance and stock markets in emerging countries," MPRA Paper 24302, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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