John Armour (University of Oxford) Simon Deakin (University of Cambridge) Prabirjit Sarkar (Jadavpur University, Kolkata) Mathias Siems (University of Edinburgh) Ajit Singh (University of Cambridge)
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Using a panel dataset covering a range of developed and developing countries, we show that common law systems were more protective of shareholder interests than civil law ones in the period 1995-2005. However, civilian systems were catching up, suggesting that civil law origin was not much of an obstacle to convergence. We find no evidence of a long-run impact of legal change on stock market development. Possible explanations are that laws have been overly protective of shareholders; transplanted laws have not worked as expected; and, more generally, the exogenous legal origin effect is not as strong as widely supposed.
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Paper provided by ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London in its series WEF Working Papers with number
0041.
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