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Price Cap Regulation and Investment Incentives under Demand Uncertainty

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Author Info
Roques, F.A.
Savva , N.S.

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Abstract

We study the effect of price cap regulation on investment in new capacity in an oligopolistic (Cournot) industry, using a continuous time model with stochastic demand. A price cap has two mutually competing effects on investment under demand uncertainty: it makes the option of deferring investment very valuable, but it also reduces the interest of strategic underinvestment to raise prices. We show that there exists an optimal price cap that maximizes investment incentives. As with deterministic demand, the optimal price cap is the clearing price of the competitive market. However, unlike the deterministic case, we show that such a price cap does not restore the competitive equilibrium; there is still under-investment. Sensitivity analyses and Monte Carlo simulations show that the efficiency of price cap regulation depends critically on demand volatility and that errors in the choice of the price cap can have detrimental consequences on investment and average prices.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0636.

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Length: 32
Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0636

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Related research
Keywords: real options; stochastic games; price cap regulation; electricity markets;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Dixit, Avinash, 1991. "Irreversible Investment with Price Ceilings," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 541-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Allaz Blaise & Vila Jean-Luc, 1993. "Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 1-16, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509.
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  5. M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, 1989. "The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 454-472, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ian M. Dobbs, 2004. "Intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 421-440, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Baldursson, Fridrik M., 1998. "Irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 627-644, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Neuhoff, Karsten & De Vries, Laurens, 2004. "Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 253-267, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Robert Earle & Karl Schmedders & Tymon Tatur, 2007. "On Price Caps Under Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(1), pages 93-111, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Joskow, P.L., 2003. "The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the U.S," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0328, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Gollier, Christian & Proult, David & Thais, Francoise & Walgenwitz, Gilles, 2005. "Choice of nuclear power investments under price uncertainty: Valuing modularity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 667-685, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Gary Biglaiser & Michael Riordan, 2000. "Dynamics of Price Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 744-767, Winter.
  13. Steven R. Grenadier, 2002. "Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment Strategies of Firms," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 691-721.
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  15. Molho, Ian, 1995. "Price Ceilings and Imperfect Competition," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 392-408, November.
  16. Bar-Ilan, Avner & Strange, William C, 1996. "Investment Lags," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 610-22, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Paul L. Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 10472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. McDonald, Robert & Siegel, Daniel, 1986. "The Value of Waiting to Invest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 707-27, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1996. "Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 596-617, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Leahy, John V, 1993. "Investment in Competitive Equilibrium: The Optimality of Myopic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 1105-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Ellen M. Pint, 1992. "Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation in a Stochastic-Cost Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 564-578, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. De Villemeur, Étienne & Gui, Benedetto, 2007. "Regulation of a Monopoly Generating Externalities," IDEI Working Papers 469, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  2. Debora Di Gioacchino, 2008. "Strategic technology choice in regulated markets with demand uncertainty," Empirica, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 145-164, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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