Derivatives and Default Risk
AbstractUpstream producers that possess market power, sell forwards with a lengthy duration to regional electricity companies (REC). As part of the liberalization of the electricity market, RECs have been privatized and exposed to a possible bankruptcy threat if spot prices have fallen below their expected value. The downstream firms’ expected profit is larger, when it is less likely to be bailed out, the effect on upstream profits is ambiguous while consumers loose. Options are less welfare increasing than forwards, but the difference is minimal. In the presence of bankruptcy, options are the preferred welfare maximizing market instrument.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11317.
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Forwards; Options; Default Risk; Market Efficiency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-01-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-01-30 (Regulation)
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