Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation
AbstractWe consider the effect of giving incentives to ordinary citizens to report po- tential criminal activity. Additionally we look at the effect of "pro ling" and biased reporting. If police single out or pro le a group for more investiga- tion, then crime in the pro led group decreases. If a certain group is reported on more frequently through biased reporting by citizens, crime in the group reported on actually increases. In the second model, we consider a neigh- bourhood structure where individuals get information on possible criminal activity by neighbours on one side and decide whether to report or not based on the signal. When costs of reporting are low relative to the cost of being investigated, costs of investigation are increasing in the number of reports and there is at least one biased individual, we show there is a "contagion equilibrium" where everyone reports his or her neighbour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 06-04r.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Neighbourhood; crime reporting and profiling;
Other versions of this item:
- Bandyopadhyay Siddhartha & Chatterjee Kalyan, 2010. "Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee, 2008. "Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation," Discussion Papers 08-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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