Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation
AbstractWe consider the effect of giving incentives to ordinary citizens to report potential criminal activity. Additionally we look at the effect of 'profiling' and biased reporting. If police single out or profile a group for more investigation, then crime in the profiled group decreases. If a certain group is reported on more frequently through biased reporting by citizens, crime in the group reported on actually increases. In the second model, we consider a neighbourhood structure where individuals get information on possible criminal activity by neighbours on one side and decide whether to report or not based on the signal. When costs of reporting are low relative to the cost of being investigated, the costs of investigation increase in the number of reports and there is at least one biased individual. We show there is a "contagion equilibrium" where everyone reports his or her neighbour.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalan Chatterjee, 2010. "Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation," Discussion Papers 06-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee, 2008. "Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation," Discussion Papers 08-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Glaeser, Edward L & Sacerdote, Bruce & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1996.
"Crime and Social Interactions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-48, May.
- Glaeser, E.L. & Scheinkman, J.A. & Sacerdote, J.A., 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," Working Papers e-95-2, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 5026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward E. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1738, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2003.
"Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1764-1777, December.
- Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2002. "Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2003.
- Goldberg, Itzhak & Nold, Frederick C, 1980. "Does Reporting Deter Burglars?-An Empirical Analysis of Risk and Return in Crime," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(3), pages 424-31, August.
- Thierry Verdier & Yves Zenou, 2004.
"Racial Beliefs, Location, And The Causes Of Crime,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 731-760, 08.
- Verdier, T. & Zenou, Y., 2000. "Racial Beliefs , Location and the Causes of Crime," DELTA Working Papers 2000-26, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Verdier, T. & Zenou, Y., 2001. "Racial beliefs, location and the causes of crime," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0101, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2000. "Racial Beliefs, Location And The Causes Of Crime," CEPR Discussion Papers 2455, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2003. "Racial Beliefs, Location and the Causes of Crime," Working Paper Series 602, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Sah, R.K., 1990.
"Social Osmosis And Patterns Of Crime: A Dynamic Economic Analysis,"
609, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2001. "Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 231-242, November.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee, 2006. "Crime as a local public bad, neighbourhood observation and reporting," Discussion Papers 06-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October.
- Conley, John P. & Wang, Ping, 2006. "Crime and ethics," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 107-123, July.
- Fender, John, 1999. "A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 437-453, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.