Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects
AbstractThis article discusses the implications of decision rules in the governance structures of transnational infrastructure projects. It stresses that decision rules strongly affect the performance of the partnership and that, consequently, attention should be given to their design at the initial stage. The article also stresses the fact that partners must not only agree on how to make ordinary decisions, but also special ones such as, for example, changing the rules along the way or making changes to the membership of the group. This paper makes the following specific points. First, the choice of partners is a key variable, which affects the choice of decision rules and, in turn, is influenced by the conditions for new entrants. Second, the choice of decision rules can crucially affect the degree of confidence and the level of cooperation among partners, as well as the speed at which the partnership adopts new decisions. Third, agreements on how to eventually change the initial set of rules and partners should be part of the design of a well established decision system.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 61.
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Salvador Barberá, 2003. "Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects," IDB Publications 38898, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Salvador Barberà, 2003. "Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 600.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999.
"Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
449, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres, 2002. "Supporting others and the evolution of influence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(12), pages 2051-2092, October.
- Salvador Barberà & Matthew O. Jackson, 2000.
"Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions,"
57, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048, August.
- Salvador BARBER?Author-Email: email@example.com & Matthew O. JACKSON, 2003. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 596.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- BARBERA, Salvador & MASCHLER, Michael & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998.
"Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2002. "Inequality among EU citizens in the EU's Council decision procedure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 475-498, September.
- Danilo Coelho, 2005. "Maximin choice of voting rules for committees," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 159-175, 07.
- Vito Tanzi, 2005. "Building regional infrastructure in Latin America," INTAL Working Papers 2642, Inter-American Development Bank, INTAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.