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Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets

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  • Oriol Tejada
  • Carles Rafels
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    Abstract

    We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and show that they are marginal worth vectors, although this does not hold for arbitrary multi-sided assignment games. Finally we show that prices that are obtained from core allocations are competitive and vice versa.

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    File URL: http://research.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/working_papers/370.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 370.

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    Date of creation: Jan 2009
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    Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:370

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    Related research

    Keywords: Assignment games; multi-sided markets; homogeneous goods; core;

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    1. Sherstyuk, K., 1997. "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 544, The University of Melbourne.
    2. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998. "Efficiency in partnership structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 331-346, August.
    3. Stuart, Harborne Jr, 1997. "The supplier-firm-buyer game and its m-sided generalization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 21-27, August.
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