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Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

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  • Oriol Tejada

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

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    Abstract

    I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found sufficient conditions, that always hold for bilateral markets, that guarantee substitutability and a extended notion of complementarity among agents in arbitrary multilateral assignment markets. I also prove that Shapleys (1962) result always holds regardless the number of sectors of the market when goods in the market are homogeneous.

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    File URL: http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E09229.rdf/at_download/file
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 229.

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    Length: 0 pages
    Date of creation: 2009
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    Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2009229

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    Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
    Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es
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    1. Sherstyuk, K., 1997. "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 544, The University of Melbourne.
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