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Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Inés Macho-Stadler
David Pérez-Castrillo ()
Nicol? Porteiro
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We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
515.02.
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Length: 24
Date of creation: 14 Jun 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:515.02Contact details of provider: Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona Phone: 34 93 592 1203 Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Coalition Formation ; Bilateral Agreements ; Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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Other versions:
J Peter Neary, 2004.
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Review of Economic Studies ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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