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Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value

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Author Info
Juan Vidal-Puga (Universidade de Vigo)

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Abstract

We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game (N,V) satisfies that V(N) is flat, the only payoff which arises in equilibrium is the Shapley NTU value.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0401/0401003.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0401003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 23 Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401003

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP; pages: 40; figures: Included
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Shapley NTU value; sequential formation of coalitions; subgame perfect equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Vidal-Puga, Juan & Bergantinos, Gustavo, 2003. "An implementation of the Owen value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 412-427, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Roth, Alvin E, 1980. "Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 457-65, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Maria Montero & Akira Okada, 2003. "Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: the Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited," Game Theory and Information 0305002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Harsanyi, John C, 1980. "Comments on Roth's Paper, "Values for Games without Side Payments"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 477, March.
  10. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicol? Porteiro, 2002. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 515.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  11. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 58-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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