Cross-Border Merger Waves

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Cross-Border Merger Waves

Author Info

Fumagalli, Eileen
Vasconcelos, Helder

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Helder Vasconcelos

Abstract

This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game with cost synergies to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between domestic and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs; and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger. We also analyze how the equilibrium market structures are affected by the presence of lobbying efforts.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5601.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5601

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-04-08 (All new papers)
NEP-COM-2006-04-08 (Industrial Competition)
NEP-FMK-2006-04-08 (Financial Markets)
NEP-IND-2006-04-08 (Industrial Organization)
NEP-INT-2006-04-08 (International Trade)

References listed on IDEAS
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Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998. "Sequential horizontal mergers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1683-1702, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Nilssen, T. & Sogard, L., 1995. "Sequential Horizontal Mergers," Papers 04-95, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Nilssen, T. & Sorgard, L., 1995. "Sequential Horizontal Mergers," Memorandum 30/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
Ramon Fauli-Oller, 2000. "Takeover Waves," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(3), pages 189-210, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ramon Fauli-Oller, 2000. "Takeover Waves," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 189-210, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gugler, Klaus & Mueller, Dennis C. & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin & Zulehner, Christine, 2003. "The effects of mergers: an international comparison," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 625-653, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Klaus Gugler & Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu & Christine Zulehner, 2001. "The Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-21, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
Barros, Pedro Pita & Hoernig, Steffen, 2004. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alberto Salvo, 2004. "A General Analysis of Sequential Merger Games with an Application to Cross-Border Mergers," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 36, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
J Peter Neary, 2004. "Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage," Working Papers 200404, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Neary, J Peter, 2004. "Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage," CEPR Discussion Papers 4325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- J. Peter Neary, 2004. "Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage," cege â Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 34, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany).. [Downloadable!]
- J. Peter Neary, 2007. "Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(4), pages 1229-1257, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicol? Porteiro, 2002. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 515.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "The equilibrium ownership of an international oligopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 307-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 1999. "The Equilibrium Ownership of an International Oligopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 2302, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 1999. "The Equilibrium Ownership of an International Oligopoly," Working Paper Series 515, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Horn, H. & Persson, L., 1999. "The Equilibrium Ownership of an International Oligopoly," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 515, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Helder Vasconcelos, 2005. "Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 39-62, Spring.
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2002. "Cross-Border Acquisitions and Greenfield Entry," Working Paper Series 570, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]

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