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Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting

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  • Inés Macho-Stadler

    ()

  • David Pérez-Castrillo

    ()

  • Nicolás Porteiro

    ()

Abstract

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0017-6
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 207-228

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:2:p:207-228

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Coalition formation; Bilateral agreements; Cournot; C72; D62; D40;

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References

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  1. Houston, Joel F. & James, Christopher M. & Ryngaert, Michael D., 2001. "Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers from the perspective of insiders and outsiders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 285-331, May.
  2. Morton I. Kamien & Israel Zang, 1988. "The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition," Discussion Papers 802, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
  4. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
  5. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Thomas J. Holmes, 2004. "Mergers and the Evolution of Industry Concentration: Results from the Dominant-Firm Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 561-582, Autumn.
  6. repec:fth:tilbur:99121 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  8. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
  9. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
  10. DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & XUE, Licun, 2002. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 2002047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Thomas J. Holmes, 2000. "Do mergers lead to monopoly in the long run? Results from the dominant firm model," Staff Report 264, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  12. Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  13. Martin Pesendorfer, 2005. "Mergers Under Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 661-679, Autumn.
  14. Seidmann, Daniel J & Winter, Eyal, 1998. "A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 793-815, October.
  15. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

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