Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Fraud
AbstractThe use of equity-based compensation is an increasingly popular means by which to align the incentives of top management with that of the shareholders. However, recent theoretical and empirical research suggests that the use of equity-based compensation has the unintended consequence of creating the incentive to commit managerial fraud of the type being reported in the press. This paper reports experimental evidence showing that the amount of fraud committed by subjects is positively correlated with the level of equity, as is the level of effort. As well, the amount of fraud that is committed is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and subjects’ risk aversion. The experimental design permits the identification of causal relations in the directions just noted. Key Words:
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 08-05.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: Thelma C. Raley Hall, Boone, North Carolina 28608
Web page: http://www.business.appstate.edu/departments/economics/
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Other versions of this item:
- David Bruner & Michael McKee & Rudy Santore, 2008. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental Investigation of Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Fraud," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 261-278, July.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2008-04-12 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-12 (Experimental Economics)
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