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Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: Evidence on the dynamics of power balance

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Author Info

  • André De Palma

    (ENS Cachan - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan - École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Nathalie Picard

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS : UMR8184 - Université de Cergy Pontoise)

  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer

    (Max Planck Institut, Strategic Interaction Group - (-))

Abstract

This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the spouses and the couples' degrees of risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when they make risky decisions and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision process that takes place when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed, the balance of power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more decision-making power than women but women who ultimately implement the joint decisions gain more and more power over the course of decision making.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00418899.

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Date of creation: 22 Sep 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00418899

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Related research

Keywords: Balance of power; Experiments; Household decision-making; Risk.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Alistair Munro & Danail Popov, 2013. "A portmanteau experiment on the relevance of individual decision anomalies for households," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 335-348, September.
  2. Alistair Munro & Arjan Verschoor & Amaresh Dubey, 2012. "Does working with spouses make teams more productive? A field experiment in India using NREGA," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-09, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
  3. Nathalie Picard & André de Palma & Ignacio A. Inoa, 2013. "Discrete Choice Decision-Making with Multiple Decision Makers within the Household," THEMA Working Papers 2013-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Yang, Xiaojun & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2012. "Intra-household decisions making on intertemporal choices: An experimental study in rural China," Working Papers in Economics 537, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  5. Carlsson, Fredrik & He, Haoran & Martinsson, Peter & Qin, Ping & Sutter, Matthias, 2010. "Household Decision Making in Rural China: Using Experiments to Estimate the Influences of Spouses," IZA Discussion Papers 5127, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Nathalie Picard & Andre de Palma & Sophie Dantan, 2013. "Intra-household discrete choice models of mode choice and residential location," THEMA Working Papers 2013-33, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  7. Carlsson, Fredrik & Yang, Xiaojun, 2013. "Intertemporal Choice Shifts in Households: Do they occur and are they good?," Working Papers in Economics 569, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  8. He, Haoran & Martinsson, Peter & Sutter, Matthias, 2012. "Group decision making under risk: An experiment with student couples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 691-693.
  9. Fredrik Carlsson & Peter Martinsson & Ping Qin & Matthias Sutter, 2013. "The influence of spouses on household decision making under risk: an experiment in rural China," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 383-401, September.
  10. Moshe Ben-Akiva & André Palma & Daniel McFadden & Maya Abou-Zeid & Pierre-André Chiappori & Matthieu Lapparent & Steven Durlauf & Mogens Fosgerau & Daisuke Fukuda & Stephane Hess & Charles Manski & , 2012. "Process and context in choice models," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 439-456, June.
  11. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Olivier l'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv, 2013. "Do Couples Discount Future Consequences Less than Individuals?," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201320, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  12. Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger, 2012. "Do husbands and wives pool their incomes? Experimental evidence," Working Papers of BETA 2012-10, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  13. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Olivier l’Haridon & Corina Paraschiv, 2013. "Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 175-191, August.

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