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The role of corporate governance in forecasting bankruptcy: Pre- and post-SOX enactment

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  • Chan, Chia-Ying
  • Chou, De-Wai
  • Lin, Jane-Raung
  • Liu, Feng-Ying

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the improved performance of bankruptcy prediction models after including corporate governance variables. The empirical results demonstrate better predictive power for financial bankruptcy than previous bankruptcy prediction models, particularly in the post-SOX period. Our theoretical argument emphasizes the urgent need for such improvements to the bankruptcy prediction model following the introduction of the SOX Act, with the empirical results providing intuitive economic meaning for all relevant market participants. Policymakers may consider enacting laws to include designs for corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, entrepreneurs may use this model to improve their own governance structures and compensation mechanisms to avoid financial bankruptcy, and investors may refer to it to ensure that ‘losers’ are excluded from their investment portfolios.

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  • Chan, Chia-Ying & Chou, De-Wai & Lin, Jane-Raung & Liu, Feng-Ying, 2016. "The role of corporate governance in forecasting bankruptcy: Pre- and post-SOX enactment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 166-188.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:35:y:2016:i:c:p:166-188
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2015.10.008
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    2. Rogoz Marius-Eugen & Stoica Dragoș-Andrei, 2021. "Compliance with the provisions of the Corporate Governance Code by companies listed on the Romanian capital market with respect to the formation and functioning of audit committees," Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, Sciendo, vol. 15(1), pages 737-748, December.
    3. Lagasio, Valentina & Brogi, Marina & Gallucci, Carmen & Santulli, Rosalia, 2023. "May board committees reduce the probability of financial distress? A survival analysis on Italian listed companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Ayoola Tajudeen John & Obokoh Lawrence Ogechukwu, 2018. "Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 10(1), pages 182-193.
    5. Nawaf Almaskati & Ron Bird & Yue Lu & Danny Leung, 2019. "The Role of Corporate Governance and Estimation Methods in Predicting Bankruptcy," Working Papers in Economics 19/16, University of Waikato.
    6. ben Jabeur, Sami & Mefteh-Wali, Salma & Carmona, Pedro, 2021. "The impact of institutional and macroeconomic conditions on aggregate business bankruptcy," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 108-119.
    7. Almaskati, Nawaf & Bird, Ron & Yeung, Danny & Lu, Yue, 2021. "A horse race of models and estimation methods for predicting bankruptcy," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

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