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Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence

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  • Choe, Chongwoo
  • Tian, Gloria
  • Yin, Xiangkang

Abstract

We study theoretically and empirically the relation among CEO power, CEO pay and firm performance. Our theoretical model follows the rent extraction view of CEO compensation put forward by the managerial power theory. We test our theoretical findings using the sample of S&P1500 firms. The predicted relation between power and pay is largely supported. However, the relation between power and firm performance has mixed support, suggesting that, while the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay, the scope of power needs to be broadened for better understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13449.

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Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13449

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Keywords: Managerial power; agency theory; stock-based compensation; firm performance; pay-performance sensitivity;

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Cited by:
  1. Dey, Tania & Banerjee, Rajabrata, 2011. "Can Corporate Diversification Promote Firm Value? A Survey," MPRA Paper 28928, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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