The provision point mechanism mitigates free riding behavior in economic experiments. In two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask respondents about their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. One of the determinants that identifies who is likely to feel the provision point will be met is the bid itself. We find that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises may result in biased willingness to pay estimates. Key Words: Provision Point Mechanism, Contingent Valuation, Willingness to Pay, Public Goods
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number
08-01.