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Contingent Valuation and Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Patricia A. Champ
  • Nicholas E. Flores
  • Thomas C. Brown
  • PJames Chivers

Abstract

We empirically investigate the effect of the payment mechanism on contingent values by asking a willingness-to-pay question with one of three different payment mechanisms: individual contribution, contribution with provision point, and referendum. We find statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the referendum treatment relative to the individual contribution treatment, some weak statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the referendum treatment relative to the provision point treatment, and no statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the provision point treatment relative to the individual contribution treatment. The relative credibility of the three payment mechanisms is also examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia A. Champ & Nicholas E. Flores & Thomas C. Brown & PJames Chivers, 2002. "Contingent Valuation and Incentives," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(4), pages 591-604.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:78:y:2002:i:4:p:591-604
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q26 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources

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