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Paper provided by University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) in its series Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers with number 30644.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ags:idpmcr:30644

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Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics;

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1. Lederman, Daniel & Loayza, Norman & Reis Soares, Rodrigo, 2001. "Accountability and corruption : political institutions matter," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2708, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005. "Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17, pages 1-35, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-48, April.
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," NBER Working Papers 3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
5. Glaeser, Edward & Scheinkman, Jose & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The injustice of inequality," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 199-222, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Injustice of Inequality," NBER Working Papers 9150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Injustice of Inequality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1967, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
6. Robert Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1057, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Cooter, Robert D., 1994. "Structural adjudication and the new law merchant: A model of decentralized law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 215-231, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
9. Fafchamps, Marcel & Minten, Bart, 1999. "Property rights in a flea market economy," MTID discussion papers 27, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fafchamps, M. & Minten, B., 1999. "Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy," Working Papers Series 99-25, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
   • Fafchamps, Marcel & Minten, Bart, 2001. "Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 229-67, January.
10. Levine, Ross, 1999. "Law, Finance, and Economic Growth," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(1-2), pages 8-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Marcel Fafchamps & Christine Moser, 2003. "Crime, Isolation and Law Enforcement," Journal of African Economies, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 625-671, December.
    Other versions:
    • Marcel Fafchamps & Christine Moser, 2003. "Crime, Isolation, and Law Enforcement," Economics Series Working Papers 140, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Fafchamps, Marcel & Moser, Christine, 2004. "Crime, Isolation, and Law Enforcement," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
12. Manion, Melanie, 1996. "Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 167-95, April.
13. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Mitchell Polinsky, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1127, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
14. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]

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