Targeting Enforcement to Improve Compliance with Environmental Regulations
AbstractBy targeting enforcement efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compliance with environmental regulations can be achieved. In this paper, the inspection minimizing targeting scheme with two groups is derived. Firms are moved at random into the target group, while escape from the target group occurs only when an inspection reveals the firm is in compliance. The optimal targeting scheme reduces inspection costs compared with the strategy suggested by Harrington (1988), where firms are moved into the target group on the basis of compliance record. However, the range of parameter values for which the optimal solution is feasible is limited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its series 2001 Conference (45th), January 23-25, 2001, Adelaide with number 125634.
Date of creation: Jan 2001
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
law enforcement; compliance; environmental regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; K32; K42;
Other versions of this item:
- Friesen, Lana, 2003. "Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 72-85, July.
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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