Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: a reconsideration under asymmetric information
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 73 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
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