This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: a reconsideration under asymmetric information

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Raymond, Mark
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-3WN70KM-6/2/f1ae8fdb10cb1410825b6b2b47db6ad5
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 73 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 289-295
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:73:y:1999:i:2:p:289-295

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "Emissions Variability in Tradable Permit Markets with Imperfect Enforcement and Banking," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 917, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A tutorial is available.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-24.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.