IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/shs/wpaper/1411.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

High Priority Violation Policy and Targeting Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis of its Effectiveness and Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Lirong Liu

    (Department of Economics, Sam Houston State University)

  • Zhou Yang

    (Department of Economics and Legal Studies, Robert Morris University)

Abstract

The High Priority Violation (HPV) Policy represents a way to target enforcement in environmental regulations; serious air pollution violators are targeted with timely and appropriate enforcement, and such enforcement usually means high degree of regulatory scrutiny. Despite the importance of enforcement, the empirical literature on the effectiveness and efficiency of targeting enforcement is very limited. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the effects of HPV policy and the externalities associated with this policy. To examine HPV targeting, dynamic panel models are employed using a rich plant-level dataset consisting of 8,736 major manufacturing facilities nationwide during the period 2001-2010. Our results suggest positive specific deterrence effects of HPV status—a four-month increase on the HPV listing time in the previous year leads to about one extra month of compliance. We also find general deterrence effects of HPV targeting—a typical facility, regardless of its HPV status, increases its compliance rate when there is an increase in the amount of fines imposed on other HPV facilities within the same state. Both the specific and general deterrence effects of enforcement differ by HPV status—HPV facilities on average are less responsive to additional specific or general enforcement actions. Thus the efficiency of HPV targeting is undermined. Potential reasons for the inefficiency include high abatement costs for HPV facilities and the inadequate addressing of the High Priority Violators by the regulators. This paper explores the effectiveness as well as efficiency of HPV policy and has important policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Lirong Liu & Zhou Yang, 2014. "High Priority Violation Policy and Targeting Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis of its Effectiveness and Efficiency," Working Papers 1411, Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:shs:wpaper:1411
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.shsu.edu/academics/economics-and-international-business/documents/wp_series/wp14-11_paper.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Friesen, Lana, 2003. "Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 72-85, July.
    2. Raymond, Mark, 1999. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: a reconsideration under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 289-295, August.
    3. Harford, Jon D., 1991. "Measurement error and state-dependent pollution control enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-81, July.
    4. Sarah L. Stafford, 2008. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(4), pages 934-951, April.
    5. Gray, Wayne B. & Deily, Mary E., 1996. "Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 96-111, July.
    6. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    7. Alberini, Anna & Austin, David H., 1999. "Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 20-48, July.
    8. Telle, Kjetil, 2013. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 24-34.
    9. Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September.
    10. Eckert, Heather, 2004. "Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 232-259, March.
    11. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
    12. Laplante, Benoit & Rilstone, Paul, 1996. "Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 19-36, July.
    13. Eric Helland, 1998. "The Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, And Self-Reporting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 141-153, February.
    14. Dietrich Earnhart, 2009. "The influence of facility characteristics and permit conditions on the effectiveness of environmental regulatory deterrence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 247-273, December.
    15. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
    16. Hanna Rema Nadeem & Oliva Paulina, 2010. "The Impact of Inspections on Plant-Level Air Emissions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-33, March.
    17. Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
    18. Wayne B. Gray, 2007. "Agency Structure and Firm Culture: OSHA, EPA, and the Steel Industry," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 685-709, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lirong Liu & Zhou Yang, 2020. "Leveraged enforcement under the EPA’s High Priority Violation Policy," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 1279-1304, March.
    2. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    3. Jay P. Shimshack, 2014. "The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 339-360, October.
    4. Sarah Stafford, 2013. "How predictable are environmental compliance inspections?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 361-388, December.
    5. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
    6. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    7. Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2020. "Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(8), pages 2558-2585, August.
    8. Earnhart, Dietrich & Friesen, Lana, 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    9. Blundell, Wesley, 2020. "When threats become credible: A natural experiment of environmental enforcement from Florida," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    10. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 123-145, April.
    11. Zach Raff & Dietrich Earnhart, 2020. "The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 118-133, April.
    12. Tihitina Andarge & Erik Lichtenberg, 2020. "Regulatory compliance under enforcement gaps," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 181-202, June.
    13. Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2022. "Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    14. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    15. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
    16. Mieno, Taro & Brozovic, Nicholas, 2012. "Unraveling deterrence effects of regulatory activities under Clean Water Act," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124612, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    17. Jessica Coria & Xiao-Bing Zhang, 2015. "State-Dependent Enforcement to Foster the Adoption of New Technologies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 359-381, October.
    18. Coria, Jessica & Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2015. "The Harrington Paradox Squared," Working Papers in Economics 608, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    19. Andarge, Tihitina & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2018. "Regulated Firm Strategy under Uncertainty about Regulatory Status," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274420, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:shs:wpaper:1411. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Raschke (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deshsus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.