Ichiro Obara at IDEAS
This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Information
about: Ichiro Obara
Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
This is information that was supplied by Ichiro Obara in registering
through RePEc. If you are Ichiro Obara , you may change this information at
RePEc . Or if
you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc . When you
register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have
authored.
Other registered authors
Personal Details
First Name: Ichiro
Middle Name:
Last Name: Obara
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID: pob3
Email: Homepage:
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/
Postal Address: Department of Economics UCLA, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
Phone: (310)794-7098Affiliation (in no particular order)
Works | Working papers | Articles | Access
and download statistics | Citations (if
any)| NEP Fields | Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML
(with abstracts ),
plain text
(with abstracts ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Working papers
David Rahman & Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000934, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Other versions:
Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Folk Theorem with Communication ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Other versions:
Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006.
"Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000285, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Other versions: Published as:
Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005.
"Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Other versions:
Ichiro Obara, 2005.
"Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
365, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
281, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Other versions: Published as:
Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
318, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Endogeous Monitoring ,"
2004 Meeting Papers
752, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Other versions:
Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
275, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!] Other versions: Published as:
Ichiro Obara, 2000.
"Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1449, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
George J. Mailath & Ichiro Obara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, .
"The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Published as:
Ichiro Obara, .
"Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
418, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ichiro Obara, .
"The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
ba7f35f1c50de4503e241d127, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Other versions:
Ichiro Obara, .
"The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
374, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Other versions:
V. Bhaskar & Ichiro Obara, .
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b114, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Other versions: Published as:
Ichiro Obara, .
"Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
399, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Articles
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 475-493, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Other versions:
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Other versions:
Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
826, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003.
"Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002.
"The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 99-122, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Other versions:
Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002.
"Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Other versions:
RePEc:bep:theadv:v:8:y:2008:i:1:p:1399-1399 is not listed on IDEAS
NEP Fields 22 papers by this author were announced in NEP , and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
NEP-BEC : Business Economics (4) 2006-08-19 2008-04-04 2008-06-21 2008-07-05
NEP-COM : Industrial Competition (1) 2004-09-30
NEP-CTA : Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2008-06-21 2008-07-05
NEP-EXP : Experimental Economics (1) 2006-09-11
NEP-GTH : Game Theory (5) 2003-01-27 2005-09-02 2005-09-29 2006-02-19 2006-09-11 Author is listed
NEP-IND : Industrial Organization (4) 2003-02-03 2003-11-23 2004-09-30 2006-08-19
NEP-MAC : Macroeconomics (1) 2004-01-05
Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).
This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .