The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
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- Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 99-122, July.
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