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The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

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  • George J. Mailath
  • Ichiro Obara
  • Tadashi Sekiguchi

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Paper provided by Penn Economics Department in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number 83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb90facc5.

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Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:83719e84b6825736ffcfdfacb90facc5

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Cited by:
  1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
  2. Roger Lagunoff & Matthew Haag, 2002. "One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.
  4. Kimmo Berg & Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Computing Equilibria in Discounted 2 × 2 Supergames," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(1), pages 71-88, January.
  5. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2010. "The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 431-443, July.
  7. Mihaela van der Schaar & Yuanzhang Xiao & William Zame, 2013. "Designing Efficient Resource Sharing For Impatient Players Using Limited Monitoring," EIEF Working Papers Series 1320, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Aug 2013.
  8. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083, April.
  9. Pedro Dal B�, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.

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