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In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers

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  • Goldluecke, Susanne
  • Kranz, Sebastian

Abstract

In this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.

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File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13222/1/332.pdf
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Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 332.

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Date of creation: Jul 2010
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:332

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  1. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, October.
  2. Mailath, George J. & Obara, Ichiro & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 99-122, July.
  3. Luis Rayo, 2007. "Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 937-963.
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  6. Jonathan Levin, 2002. "Multilateral Contracting And The Employment Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1075-1103, August.
  7. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
  8. Tomas Gal & Josef Nedoma, 1972. "Multiparametric Linear Programming," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(7), pages 406-422, March.
  9. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Harrington, Joseph E., 2005. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Research Papers 1885, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
  11. Katherine Doornik, 2006. "Relational Contracting in Partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 517-548, 06.
  12. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1990. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1041-63, September.
  13. Kenneth L. Judd & Sevin Yeltekin & James Conklin, 2003. "Computing Supergame Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1239-1254, 07.
  14. Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  15. Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  16. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-89, July.
  17. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  18. Klimenko, Mikhail & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2001. "Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt9xm2x5w7, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  19. Kranz, Sebastian & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 259, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
  3. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
  4. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 405-407.
  5. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.

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