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Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam

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  • Lan T. Pham

    (Faculty of Life Sciences, Division of Resource Economics, Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany†Faculty of Economics and Rural Development, Department of Resource and Environmental Economics, Vietnam National University of Agriculture, Trauquy Commune, Gialam District, Hanoi, Vietnam)

  • Ilona M. Otto

    (#x2021;Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Climate Impacts and Vulnerabilities, Telegraphenberg A51, 14473 Potsdam, Germany)

  • Dimitrios Zikos

    (Faculty of Life Sciences, Division of Resource Economics, Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

This paper employs laboratory and framed field experiments to investigate factors influencing the behavior of irrigation users, with an emphasis on the effects of exogenously and endogenously designed allocation rules. The experiments were conducted with 36 groups of farmers and students from China, India and Vietnam. The results show that physically asymmetric access to water as a resource creates an asymmetric distribution of investments, harvests and revenues that favors upstream users. Exogenously designed allocation rules appear able to equalize the distribution of revenue between upstream and downstream users, but are also likely to reduce the volume of investment and generated revenue. Meanwhile, communication between irrigation users with the possibility of endogenously designed rules appears to have a stronger equalizing effect on asymmetric resource access but also increases overall investment, which then increases water availability in a hypothetical irrigation channel. This suggests that promoting participation of irrigation users in designing rules for water distribution, water use monitoring and sanctioning might improve the performance of irrigation systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Lan T. Pham & Ilona M. Otto & Dimitrios Zikos, 2019. "Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-28, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wepxxx:v:05:y:2019:i:01:n:s2382624x18500091
    DOI: 10.1142/S2382624X18500091
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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Alicia Dipierri & Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-21, December.
    2. Hua Xing & Shuhong Mo & Xiaoyan Liang & Ying Li, 2021. "Water Resources Allocation Based on Complex Adaptive System Theory in the Inland River Irrigation District," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(15), pages 1-19, July.
    3. Ahmed Soliman & Andreas Thiel & Matteo Roggero, 2021. "Institutional Performance of Collective Irrigation Systems: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis in the Nile Delta of Egypt," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-29, January.
    4. Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "Revisiting the Role of Institutions in Transformative Contexts: Institutional Change and Conflicts," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(21), pages 1-20, October.
    5. Kasymov, Ulan & Wang, Xiaoxi & Zikos, Dimitrios & Chopan, Massih & Ibele, Benedikt, 2022. "Institutional Barriers to Sustainable Forest Management: Evidence from an Experimental Study in Tajikistan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

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