IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/wepxxx/v04y2018i03ns2382624x1850008x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Roßner

    (Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin, Germany)

  • Dimitrios Zikos

    (#x2020;IRI-THESys/Division of Resource Economics, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

The governance of common-pool resources, such as irrigation systems, is a highly debated topic in research. Numerous studies suggest that actors can successfully manage these resources through cooperation, especially in hybrid governance structures, if they are able to design and enforce their own rules. Thereby, certain factors, such as the composition of a group of resource users, influence the likelihood of cooperation and the performance of self-managed resource systems. This study employed an economic framed field experiment to compare the effects of externally imposed and self-set rules of water distribution on homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of irrigation users who differ in their economic endowment. The experiment was conducted with 20 farmers in an Uzbek community. Furthermore, questionnaires, group discussions and interviews complemented the analytical method. The results show that groups, homogeneous in their economic endowment are more inclined to comply with self-designed rules than groups that are economically heterogeneous. Thus, homogenous groups achieve a better performance in terms of resource maintenance and water harvest under self-governance. However, water distribution was more equal and the illegal activities decreased in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous groups with self-implemented rules. It was found that trust was a crucial factor regarding both greater individual rule adherence and more cooperative behavior within homogeneous entities compared to heterogeneous groups of irrigation users. Finally, the results support the argument that economic heterogeneity among resource users lowers the likeliness of cooperation in self-governed common-pool resource systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Roßner & Dimitrios Zikos, 2018. "The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-30, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wepxxx:v:04:y:2018:i:03:n:s2382624x1850008x
    DOI: 10.1142/S2382624X1850008X
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2382624X1850008X
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S2382624X1850008X?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tanja Baerlein & Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2015. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, January.
    2. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 16, pages 267-297, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444.
    4. George Hendrikse & Mika Tuunanen & Josef Windsperger & Gérard Cliquet, 2008. "Strategy and Governance of Networks," Post-Print halshs-00480202, HAL.
    5. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May.
    6. Otto, Ilona M. & Wechsung, Frank, 2014. "The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 10-20.
    7. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    8. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    9. Mark Isaac, R. & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., 1985. "Public goods provision in an experimental environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-74, February.
    10. G. Hodgson, 2007. "What Are Institutions?," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 8.
    11. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Analyzing collective action," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(s1), pages 155-166, November.
    12. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
    13. Andrey Zaikin & Ana Espinola-Arredondo, 2012. "The Carrot or the Stick: Water Allocation Strategies for Uzbekistan," Working Papers 2012-2, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    14. Ostrom, Elinor, 2002. "Common-pool resources and institutions: Toward a revised theory," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1315-1339, Elsevier.
    15. Claude Ménard, 2004. "The Economics of Hybrid Organizations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 345-376, September.
    16. John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), 2013. "Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12964.
    17. Charles W. L. Hill, 1995. "National Institutional Structures, Transaction Cost Economizing and Competitive Advantage: The Case of Japan," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 119-131, February.
    18. Guido Van Huylenbroeck & Anne Vuylsteke & Wim Verbeke, 2009. "Public Good Markets: The Possible Role of Hybrid Governance Structures in Institutions for Sustainability," Springer Books, in: Volker Beckmann & Martina Padmanabhan (ed.), Institutions and Sustainability, chapter 9, pages 175-191, Springer.
    19. Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, François & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Worrapimphong, Kobchai, 2012. "Field experiments on irrigation dilemmas," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 65-75.
    20. Konrad Hagedorn, 2013. "Natural resource management: the role of cooperative institutions and governance," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 2(1), pages 101-121, September.
    21. Vatn, Arild, 2005. "Rationality, institutions and environmental policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-217, November.
    22. Commons, John R., 1931. "Institutional Economics," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 21, pages 648-657.
    23. Dimitrios Zikos & Alevgul Sorman & Marisa Lau, 2015. "Beyond water security: asecuritisation and identity in Cyprus," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 309-326, September.
    24. Munira Aminova & Iskandar Abdullayev, 2009. "Water Management in a State-Centered Environment: Water Governance Analysis of Uzbekistan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-26, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kwabena A. Owusu & Micaela M. Kulesz & Agostino Merico, 2019. "Extraction Behaviour and Income Inequalities Resulting from a Common Pool Resource Exploitation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-13, January.
    2. Frederick Ahen, 2019. "Making Resource Democracy Radically Meaningful for Stakeowners: Our World, Our Rules?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-23, September.
    3. Amirova, Iroda & Petrick, Martin & Djanibekov, Nodir, 2019. "Long- and short-term determinants of water user cooperation: Experimental evidence from Central Asia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 10-25.
    4. Ana Alicia Dipierri & Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-21, December.
    5. Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "Revisiting the Role of Institutions in Transformative Contexts: Institutional Change and Conflicts," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(21), pages 1-20, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tanja Baerlein & Ulan Kasymov & Dimitrios Zikos, 2015. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, January.
    2. Lan T. Pham & Ilona M. Otto & Dimitrios Zikos, 2019. "Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-28, January.
    3. Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "Revisiting the Role of Institutions in Transformative Contexts: Institutional Change and Conflicts," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(21), pages 1-20, October.
    4. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    5. Yubing Fan & Zeng Tang & Seong C. Park, 2019. "Effects of Community Perceptions and Institutional Capacity on Smallholder Farmers’ Responses to Water Scarcity: Evidence from Arid Northwestern China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-21, January.
    6. Anderies, John M. & Janssen, Marco A. & Lee, Allen & Wasserman, Hannah, 2013. "Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 166-176.
    7. Michiko Iizuka & Jorge Katz, 2015. "Globalisation, Sustainability and the Role of Institutions: The Case of the Chilean Salmon Industry," Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG, vol. 106(2), pages 140-153, April.
    8. Ashok Chakravarti, 2012. "Institutions, Economic Performance and the Visible Hand," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14751.
    9. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    10. Paul, Bénédique, 2012. "Technology and institutions: Theoretical aspects of institutional innovation and its deficiency in Haiti," MPRA Paper 39140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David, 2015. "Emotion venting and punishment in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 55-67.
    12. Nicole Rogge & Insa Theesfeld & Carola Strassner, 2018. "Social Sustainability through Social Interaction—A National Survey on Community Gardens in Germany," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-18, April.
    13. Robbett, Andrea, 2016. "Sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 121-138.
    14. Arruñada Benito & Andonova Veneta, 2008. "Judges' Cognition and Market Order," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 665-692, December.
    15. Matthew Osborne & Emma Sundström & Örjan Bodin, 2019. "Ecological interdependencies and resource competition: The role of information and communication in promoting effective collaboration in complex management situations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(12), pages 1-22, December.
    16. Krzysztof Waśniewski, 2015. "Discretionary freedom of choice and risk in alternative capital markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 573-605, June.
    17. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
    18. Sujoy Chakravarty & Carine Sebi & E. Somanathan & Emmanuel Theophilus, 2013. "The Demographics of Cooperation: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Gori-Ganga Basin," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 231-269, July.
    19. Sujoy Chakravarty & Carine Sebi & E. Somanathan & E. Theophilus, 2011. "Voluntary Contribution in the Field: An Experiment in the Indian Himalayas," Working Papers id:3490, eSocialSciences.
    20. Ana Alicia Dipierri & Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-21, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:wepxxx:v:04:y:2018:i:03:n:s2382624x1850008x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/wep/wep.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.