IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/agisys/v109y2012icp65-75.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Field experiments on irrigation dilemmas

Author

Listed:
  • Janssen, Marco A.
  • Bousquet, François
  • Cardenas, Juan-Camilo
  • Castillo, Daniel
  • Worrapimphong, Kobchai

Abstract

It is often assumed that irrigation systems require a central authority to solve coordination problems due to the asymmetry in position and influence between those located at the head-end of a system and those located at the tail-end. However, many examples of complex irrigation systems exist that are self-organized without central coordination. Field experiments on asymmetric commons dilemmas are performed with villagers in rural Colombia and Thailand. Our experiments show that there is a dynamic interaction between equality in the use of the common resource, and the level of the contributions to the creation of a common resource. Inequality in the distribution of benefits in one round triggers lower levels of group contributions, reducing efficiency and triggering even more inequality in contributions and distribution of the resource among players.

Suggested Citation

  • Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, François & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Worrapimphong, Kobchai, 2012. "Field experiments on irrigation dilemmas," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 65-75.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:agisys:v:109:y:2012:i:c:p:65-75
    DOI: 10.1016/j.agsy.2012.03.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308521X12000376
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.agsy.2012.03.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pretty, Jules & Ward, Hugh, 2001. "Social Capital and the Environment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 209-227, February.
    2. Glenn W. Harrison & Morten I. Lau & E. Elisabet Rutström, 2007. "Estimating Risk Attitudes in Denmark: A Field Experiment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 341-368, June.
    3. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    4. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
    5. Joseph Henrich & Steve J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan, 2010. "The Weirdest People in the World?," RatSWD Working Papers 139, German Data Forum (RatSWD).
    6. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    7. Aggarwal, Rimjhim M. & Narayan, Tulika A., 2004. "Does inequality lead to greater efficiency in the use of local commons? The role of strategic investments in capacity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 163-182, January.
    8. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
    9. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Esther Blanco & Maria Claudia Lopez & James M. Walker, 2016. "The Opportunity Costs of Conservation with Deterministic and Probabilistic Degradation Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(2), pages 255-273, June.
    2. Juan A Lacomba & Francisco Lagos & Javier Perote, 2017. "The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(7), pages 1-14, July.
    3. Otto, Ilona M. & Wechsung, Frank, 2014. "The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 10-20.
    4. Nhim, Tum & Richter, Andries, 2022. "Path dependencies and institutional traps in water governance – Evidence from Cambodia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    5. Blanco, Esther & Lopez, Maria Claudia & Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio, 2015. "Exogenous degradation in the commons: Field experimental evidence," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 430-439.
    6. Robert Roßner & Dimitrios Zikos, 2018. "The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-30, July.
    7. Ana Alicia Dipierri & Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-21, December.
    8. Bell, Andrew & Zhang, Wei & Nou, Keosothea, 2016. "Pesticide use and cooperative management of natural enemy habitat in a framed field experiment," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-13.
    9. Ma’Mun, Sitti Rahma & Loch, Adam & Young, Michael D., 2021. "Sustainable irrigation in Indonesia: A case study of Southeast Sulawesi Province," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    10. Falk, Thomas & Kumar, Shalander & Srigiri, Srinivasa, 2019. "Experimental games for developing institutional capacity to manage common water infrastructure in India," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 260-269.
    11. Silva, Felipe de Figuereido & Fulginiti, Lilyan E. & Perrin, Richard K. & Burbach, Marck, 2021. "Does engagement improve groundwater management?," Staff Papers 311051, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    12. Ivo Baur & Heinrich H. Nax, 2018. "Adapting Governance Incentives to Avoid Common Pool Resource Underuse: The Case of Swiss Summer Pastures," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-20, October.
    13. Gáfaro, Margarita & Mantilla, Cesar, 2021. "Environmental valuation using bargaining games: an application to water," OSF Preprints tcfyb, Center for Open Science.
    14. Lan T. Pham & Ilona M. Otto & Dimitrios Zikos, 2019. "Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-28, January.
    15. Anderies, John M. & Janssen, Marco A. & Lee, Allen & Wasserman, Hannah, 2013. "Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 166-176.
    16. Kimmich, Christian & Sagebiel, Julian, 2016. "Empowering irrigation: A game-theoretic approach to electricity utilization in Indian agriculture," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PB), pages 174-185.
    17. Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, François & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Worrapimphong, Kobchai, 2013. "Breaking the elected rules in a field experiment on forestry resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 132-139.
    18. Wegmann, Johannes & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2019. "Groundwater management institutions in the face of rapid urbanization – Results of a framed field experiment in Bengaluru, India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-1.
    19. Lang, Dengxiao & Ertsen, Maurits W., 2023. "Modelling farmland dynamics in response to farmer decisions using an advanced irrigation-related agent-based model," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 486(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matteo M. Galizzi & Daniel Navarro-Martinez, 2019. "On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 976-1002, March.
    2. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Luz Angela Rodríguez & Nancy Johnson, 2014. "Vertical Collective Action: Addressing Vertical Asymmetries in Watershed Management," Documentos CEDE 12608, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Bogliacino, Francesco & Codagnone, Cristiano, 2021. "Microfoundations, behaviour, and evolution: Evidence from experiments," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 372-385.
    4. Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2012. "Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 17-34.
    5. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Kuhn, Michael A., 2013. "Experimental methods: Extra-laboratory experiments-extending the reach of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 93-100.
    6. Filippos Exadaktylos & Antonio M. Espin & Pablo Branas-Garza, 2012. "Experimental Subjects are Not Different," Working Papers 12-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    7. Uri Gneezy & Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, 2016. "Ode to the Sea: Workplace Organizations and Norms of Cooperation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(595), pages 1856-1883, September.
    8. Julie Novakova & Jaroslav Flegr, 2013. "How Much Is Our Fairness Worth? The Effect of Raising Stakes on Offers by Proposers and Minimum Acceptable Offers in Dictator and Ultimatum Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(4), pages 1-9, April.
    9. Handberg, Øyvind Nystad & Angelsen, Arild, 2015. "Experimental tests of tropical forest conservation measures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 346-359.
    10. Pfaff, Alexander & Vélez, Maria Alejandra & Ramos, Pablo Andres & Molina, Adriana, 2015. "Framed field experiment on resource scarcity & extraction: Path-dependent generosity within sequential water appropriation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 416-429.
    11. D’Exelle, Ben & Lecoutere, Els & Van Campenhout, Bjorn, 2012. "Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing: Evidence from a Field Lab in Rural Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2537-2551.
    12. Timilsina, Raja Rajendra & Kotani, Koji, 2017. "Evaluating the potential of marketable permits in a framed field experiment: Forest conservation in Nepal," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(PA), pages 25-37.
    13. Francesco GUALA, 2010. "Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate," Departmental Working Papers 2010-23, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    14. Dohmen, Thomas, 2014. "Behavioral labor economics: Advances and future directions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 71-85.
    15. Sujoy Chakravarty & Carine Sebi & E. Somanathan & Emmanuel Theophilus, 2013. "The Demographics of Cooperation: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Gori-Ganga Basin," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 231-269, July.
    16. Grüner, S. & Hirschauer, N. & Mußhoff, O., 2015. "Potenzial verschiedener experimenteller Designs für die Politikfolgenabschätzung," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 50, March.
    17. Sujoy Chakravarty & Carine Sebi & E. Somanathan & E. Theophilus, 2011. "Voluntary Contribution in the Field: An Experiment in the Indian Himalayas," Working Papers id:3490, eSocialSciences.
    18. Gizatulina, Alia & Gorelkina, Olga, 2021. "Selling “Money” on eBay: A field study of surplus division," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 19-38.
    19. Bogliacino, Francesco & Grimalda, Gianluca & Jimenez, Laura, 2017. "Consultative Democracy & Trust," MPRA Paper 82138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:agisys:v:109:y:2012:i:c:p:65-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/agsy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.