Field experiments on irrigation dilemmas
AbstractIt is often assumed that irrigation systems require a central authority to solve coordination problems due to the asymmetry in position and influence between those located at the head-end of a system and those located at the tail-end. However, many examples of complex irrigation systems exist that are self-organized without central coordination. Field experiments on asymmetric commons dilemmas are performed with villagers in rural Colombia and Thailand. Our experiments show that there is a dynamic interaction between equality in the use of the common resource, and the level of the contributions to the creation of a common resource. Inequality in the distribution of benefits in one round triggers lower levels of group contributions, reducing efficiency and triggering even more inequality in contributions and distribution of the resource among players.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Agricultural Systems.
Volume (Year): 109 (2012)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/agsy
Field experiments; Irrigation; Common pool resources; Asymmetry; Trust;
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