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The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations

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  • Ana Alicia Dipierri

    (Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS Aspirant research fellow), Rue d’Egmont 5, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium & Centre Emile Bernheim de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Gestion (CEBRIG), Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50 CP 139, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium)

  • Dimitrios Zikos

    (International Development and Economics Programme, Department of Economics, HTW University of Applied Sciences, Treskowallee 8, 10318 Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

Extreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution mechanisms—one of Ostrom’s acclaimed Design Principles—when social-ecological systems are exposed to physical external disturbances. The theoretical propositions predict that social-ecological systems with conflict-resolution mechanisms will perform better than those without them. We tested this proposition through a framed field experiment that mimicked an irrigation system. This asymmetric setting exposed farmers to two (2) dilemmas: (i) how much to invest in the communal irrigation system’s maintenance and (ii) how much water to extract. The setting added a layer of complexity: water availability depended not only on the investment but also on the environmental variability. Our findings confirmed the theoretical proposition: groups with stronger ‘institutional robustness’ can cope with environmental variations better than those with weaker robustness. However, we also found that some groups, despite lacking conflict-resolution mechanisms, were also able to address environmental variations. We explored potential explanatory variables to these unexpected results. We found that subjects’ and groups’ attributes might address uncertainty and avert conflict. Thus, social-ecological systems’ capacity to respond to external disturbances, such as environmental variations, might not only be a question of Design Principles. Instead, it might also be strongly related to group members’ attributes and group dynamics. Our results pave the way for further research, hinting that some groups might be better equipped for mitigation measures, while others might be better equipped for adaptation measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Alicia Dipierri & Dimitrios Zikos, 2020. "The Role of Common-Pool Resources’ Institutional Robustness in a Collective Action Dilemma under Environmental Variations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-21, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:12:y:2020:i:24:p:10526-:d:462902
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    3. Yevheniia Varyvoda & Douglas Taren, 2022. "Considering Ecosystem Services in Food System Resilience," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(6), pages 1-16, March.

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