Private brands, governance, and relational exchange within retailer-manufacturer relationships: Evidence from Irish food manufacturers supplying the Irish and British grocery markets
AbstractThis study adopts the transaction cost framework to shed light upon governance structures within the context of retailer-manufacturer relationships. It argues that a retailer's investment in establishing itself as a retail brand is frequently based on the willingness of manufacturers to make specific investments. Two complementary flows of quasi-rents are created, resulting in a safeguarding problem for both parties. The appropriate governance structure is posited as a solution to this issue. Based on an empirical analysis of 104 trading relationships between Irish food manufacturers and their Irish and British retail customers, the authors find that the degree of relational exchange, or “closeness,” established between food retailers and manufacturers is positively related to both parties' specific investments, perceptions of interdependency, expectations of relationship continuity and attractiveness, but negatively related to symmetric dependency and retailers' ability to sanction their suppliers. [EconLit Classification: L220]. Â© 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 22: 1-20, 2006.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Agribusiness.
Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1520-6297
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klein, Benjamin & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 265-97, October.
- Hsieh, David A., 1983. "A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator for time series regressions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 281-290, August.
- Joskow, Paul L, 1985.
"Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
- Paul Joskow, 1984. "Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal Burning Electric Generating Plants," Working papers 361, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Masten, Scott E & Meehan, James W, Jr & Snyder, Edward A, 1991. "The Costs of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.