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Evolución de preferencias bajo escenarios de información completa e incompleta: teoría y evidencia experimental

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Author Info
César A.Salazar
Mauricio G.Villena ()

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Abstract

La presente investigación tiene dos objetivos básicos. Primero, se utilizarán elementos de la Teoría de Juegos Evolutivos para evaluar la estabilidad de distintos tipos de preferencias en el contexto de la explotación de un recurso de propiedad común. En particular, analizaremos la evolución de preferencias egoístas, altruistas y envidiosas usando un “enfoque evolutivo indirecto” como el propuesto por Bester y Güth (1998). Los resultados básicos de nuestro modelo teórico plantean que en un escenario de información completa las preferencias evolutivamente estables serán envidiosas, las que implican un nivel de esfuerzo por sobre el nivel sugerido por el equilibrio Nash. En cambio, en términos de información incompleta las preferencias que prevalecerán serán las egoístas. Un segundo objetivo es evaluar experimentalmente las predicciones teóricas encontradas en la primera parte de este trabajo. Para este propósito se realizan dos tratamientos distintos del experimento estándar de un juego de explo

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.

Volume (Year): 32 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 Year 2005 (December)
Pages: 159-186
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Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:32:y:2005:i:2:p:159-186

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Related research
Keywords: Economía Experimental; Preferencias Endógenas; Estabilidad Evolutiva; Recursos de Propiedad Común.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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