Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction
AbstractWe replicate and extend an experiment due to Walker and Gardner by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the Gardner and Walker result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. Face-to-face communication significantly increases mean efficiency. Three groups of five sustain a “good” Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a “good”equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 1996-02.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1996
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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