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Promotion Systems and Organizational Performance: A Contingency Model

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  • Steven E. Phelan
  • Zhiang Lin

Abstract

This study explores the organizational impact of a variety of important promotion systems commonly practiced in organizations including up-or-out systems, absolute merit-based systems, relative merit-based systems, and seniority-based systems. Through the computer simulation of organizations in a distributed decision making setting, the results indicate that the effectiveness of any promotion system is dependent on a range of factors including the nature of the task environment, the design of the organizational structure, the frequency of monitoring, the criteria of performance, and the transferability of task knowledge. This study has implications not only for understanding organizational promotion systems from the contingency perspective, but also for bridging the fields of strategic human resource management and computational organization theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven E. Phelan & Zhiang Lin, 2001. "Promotion Systems and Organizational Performance: A Contingency Model," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 207-232, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:7:y:2001:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1011986519310
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1011986519310
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    3. Th'eo Durandard, 2023. "Dynamic delegation in promotion contests," Papers 2308.05668, arXiv.org.
    4. Jisung Kim & Richard M. Burton, 2002. "The Effect of Task Uncertainty and Decentralization on Project Team Performance," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 365-384, December.
    5. Cheng, Yuan & Chang, Meng & Xue, Yanbo, 2020. "A computational study of promotion dynamics and organizational efficiency," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 560(C).
    6. Соколов М. М., 2019. "Трансформирующие И Селективные Системы: Исследование По Сравнительной Социологии Академических Рынков И Карьер," Вопросы образования // Educational Studies Moscow, National Research University Higher School of Economics, issue 2, pages 35-77.
    7. Phong Nguyen & Chuong Dang & Lam Nguyen, 2015. "Would Better Earning, Work Environment, and Promotion Opportunities Increase Employee Performance? An Investigation in State and Other Sectors in Vietnam," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 565-579, December.
    8. Udhayanan, Prateksha & Mishra, Swasti S. & Rao, Shrisha, 2021. "Firm dynamics and employee performance management in duopoly markets," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 583(C).
    9. Mikhail Sokolov, 2019. "Transformative and Selective Systems: A Study in Comparative Sociology of Academic Markets Careers," Voprosy obrazovaniya / Educational Studies Moscow, National Research University Higher School of Economics, issue 2, pages 35-77.
    10. Shih-Hsien Tseng & Hsiu-Chuan Chen & Tien Son Nguyen, 2022. "Key Success Factors of Sustainable Organization for Traditional Manufacturing Industries: A Case Study in Taiwan," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(22), pages 1-17, November.

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