Contract Length and the Return to Performance in Major League Baseball
AbstractThis article focuses on the relationship between contract length and compensation in Major League Baseball. Because the best players receive both the highest salaries and the longest contracts, wage regressions that omit length can lead to misleading inferences. Although contract duration is positively related with salaries, the authors find evidence of a negative relationship between contract length and a player's return to performance. These results indicate some type of tradeoff going on in the negotiation process that has not been identified in the previous literature on compensating wage differentials.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.
Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
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- Jahn K. Hakes & Chad Turner, 2008. "Long-Term Contracts in Major League Baseball," Working Papers 0831, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
- Helmut Dietl & Tobias Duschl & Markus Lang, 2010.
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