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Efficient and Equitable Airport Slot Allocation

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Author Info
Daniele Condorelli () (University College London)

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Abstract

This paper studies slot allocation at congested airports in Europe. First, I discuss the inefficiencies of the current regulation, introduced as part of the liberalisation process of the air transport market. Then, I consider three marked based methods which are suitable to achieve a more efficient allocation of slots to airlines: congestion pricing, auctions and secondary trading. These methods are examined in terms of their ability to improve efficiency and in terms of their implications on the distribution of slots’ scarcity rents. Special attention is drawn to complementarities between slots. Finally, I propose to auction slots periodically, allowing secondary trading well before the first auction takes place. By selling slots before the first auction incumbents can be partially compensated for the subsequent withdrawal of their slots.

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File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2007/gen-feb/Condorelli.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-February)
Pages: 81-104
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Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:81-104

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Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
R41 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion

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  1. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 95-124, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Levine, Michael E, 1969. "Landing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 79-108, April.
  7. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Borenstein, Severin, 1988. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Operating Licenses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 357-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joseph I. Daniel, 2009. "The Untolled Problems with Airport Slot Constraints," Working Papers 09-09, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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