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Conférence François-Albert Angers (1999). Enchères : théorie économique et réalité

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  • Richard, Jean-François

    (Université de Pittsburgh)

Abstract

This article presents a synthesis of contributions relative to empirical game theoretic models. The main topics which are discussed are: structural models, identification, equilibrium solutions, resolution by Monte-Carlo simulation, estimation and applications. Cet article présente une synthèse de travaux relatifs aux modèles empiriques de la théorie des jeux. Les principaux sujets abordés sont : modèles structurels, identification, solutions d’équilibre, résolution par simulation de Monte-Carlo, estimation et applications.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 76 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (juin)
Pages: 173-198

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:76:y:2000:i:2:p:173-198

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Web page: http://www.scse.ca/
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  1. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-99, August.
  2. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Rules of thumb in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-13, September.
  3. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Bargaining rules of thumb," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 15-24, September.
  4. Anthony A. Smith, Jr., 1991. "Solving Stochastic Dynamic Programming Problems Using Rules Of Thumb," Working Papers 816, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Florens, Jean-Pierre & Hugo, Marie-Anne & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Game theory econometric models: application to procurements in the space industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 951-959, April.
  6. Barton L. Lipman, 1993. "Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey," Working Papers 872, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  7. C. Monica Capra, 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June.
  8. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
  9. Hardle, W., 1992. "Applied Nonparametric Methods," Discussion Paper 1992-6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
  11. Armantier, O. & Florens, J.-P. & Richard, J.-F., 1998. "Empirical Game Theoretic Models: Constrained Equilibrium & Simulation," Papers 98.498, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  12. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
  13. Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(03), pages 517-567, August.
  14. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  15. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1989. "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-91.
  16. John H. Kagel & Jean-Francois Richard, 2001. "Super-Experienced Bidders In First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Rules Of Thumb, Nash Equilibrium Bidding, And The Winner'S Curse," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 408-419, August.
  17. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
  18. Oliver LINTON, . "Applied nonparametric methods," Statistic und Oekonometrie 9312, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  19. Camerer, Colin & Ho, Teck-Hua, 1997. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach," Working Papers 1003, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  20. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
  21. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
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