Empirical Game Theoretic Models: Constrained Equilibrium & Simulation
AbstractWe propose an operational concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) applicable to a broad class of empirical game theoreticmodels with incomplete information. By restricting the players' strategic sets, we can compute solutions from a strategic form of analyis based upon auxiliary Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 98.498.
Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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GAME THEORY ; ECONOMETRICS ; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;
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- Richard, Jean-François, 2000. "Conférence François-Albert Angers (1999). Enchères : théorie économique et réalité," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(2), pages 173-198, juin.
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