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Empirical Game Theoretic Models: Constrained Equilibrium & Simulation

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Author Info
Armantier, O.
Florens, J.-P.
Richard, J.-F.

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Abstract

We propose an operational concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) applicable to a broad class of empirical game theoreticmodels with incomplete information. By restricting the players' strategic sets, we can compute solutions from a strategic form of analyis based upon auxiliary Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 98.498.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.498

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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY ; ECONOMETRICS ; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium Approximations in Games of Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 99-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Patrick Bajari, . "Comparing Competition and Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Numerical Approach," Working Papers 00003, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eklöf, Matias, 2003. "Assessing Social Costs of Inefficient Procurement Design," Working Paper Series 2003:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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