Assessing Social Costs of Inefficient Procurement Design
AbstractThis paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first price, sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium concept and estimate the structural parameters of the bidders’ distribution of costs. We estimate social costs defined as the predicted cost difference between the winning firm and the most efficient bidding firm. We also compare the expected procurement costs under two different auction formats. The data is collected from procurement auctions of road painting in Sweden during 1993-99. The results indicate that the social costs of inefficient contract allocation is about 1.7 per cent of total potential social cost and that an efficient second price auction would lower the expected procurement cost by 2.8 per cent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2003:12.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 26 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Journal of the European Economic Association.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Procurement auctions; inefficiency; constrained strategy equilibrium; simulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-03-19 (All new papers)
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