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Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions

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  • Cheng, Harrison
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 42 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 4-5 (August)
    Pages: 471-498

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:4-5:p:471-498

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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    1. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
    2. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
    4. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December.
    5. Jonathan Levin & Susan Athey & Enrique Seira, 2004. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2004.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 395-409, November.
    7. Hansen, Robert G, 1986. "Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 125-42, January.
    8. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp291, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    9. Paul Klemperer, 1997. "Auctions with Almost Common Values: The Wallet Game and its Applications," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 1998-W03, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1617-1635, July.
    2. Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2011. "Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute ECO2011/27, European University Institute.
    3. Todd Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 269-302, June.
    4. Timothy Hubbard & René Kirkegaard & Harry Paarsch, 2013. "Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 241-266, August.
    5. Hafalir, Isa & Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 589-602, September.
    6. Arieh Gavious & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 369-393, May.
    7. Timothy P. Hubbard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2012. "On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto 291, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    8. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.

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