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L’économie minière ou pétrolière : deux familles résident sous le même toit

Author

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  • Giraud, Pierre-Noël

    (CERNA)

  • Nappi, Carmine

    (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)

Abstract

This paper presents the work of a group of mineral or petroleum economists arguing that a significant contribution to this field of economics may be made even if you are not an Hotelling disciple. The group's publications place a greater emphasis on factors such as the demand for mineral resources and the declining trend in their intensity of use, technological change, as well as the econometric modelling of their industries and markets. Their contribution allows a better understanding of the forces structuring the organization of the resource industry and permits a more relevant discussion of the public policies affecting it. Finally, they point out that the ultimate availability of exhaustible resources cannot be known, that mineral discoveries are constantly being made and that the speed of technological change in the production and consumption of these resources is not slowing down. Given these factors, their work questions the relevance of the hypothesis that a fixed stock of exhaustible resources is available at each point in time and that the true cost of its use by the current generation is the lower level available to future generations. Cet article fait mieux connaître les travaux d’un groupe d’économistes qui tout en ne suivant pas les traces d’Hotelling estiment non seulement faire partie de la grande famille de l’économie minière ou pétrolière, mais aussi y contribuer significativement. Leurs travaux accordent une grande importance à des facteurs tels la demande des ressources et le déclin de leur intensité d’utilisation, les changements technologiques ou encore la modélisation économétrique des industries et marchés miniers ou énergétiques. Ces travaux permettent une meilleure connaissance des forces qui déterminent l’organisation d’une industrie de ressources non renouvelables, ainsi qu’une discussion plus pertinente des politiques publiques la concernant. Enfin, en signalant que la disponibilité ultime de ces ressources ne peut être connue, que les efforts d’exploration continuent à rapporter des fruits et que le rythme des changements technologiques au niveau de la production et de la consommation ne semble pas ralentir, ces travaux ont contribué à remettre en question l’hypothèse voulant qu’il existe à chaque point dans le temps un stock fixe de ressources épuisables et que leur utilisation par la génération présente s’effectue au coût d’une consommation moindre pour les générations futures.

Suggested Citation

  • Giraud, Pierre-Noël & Nappi, Carmine, 1994. "L’économie minière ou pétrolière : deux familles résident sous le même toit," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(4), pages 477-497, décembre.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:70:y:1994:i:4:p:477-497
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